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1. Introduction 
European Parliament elections are in several ways 
different from national elections (e.g., Reif & Schmitt, 
1980; Schmitt & Thomassen, 1999; Thomassen, 2009; 
Van der Brug & de Vreese, 2016; Van der Eijk & 
Franklin, 1996; Van der Brug & Van der Eijk, 2007). For 
one thing, national elections do, to some extent, pro-
vide voters with the opportunity to hold incumbents 
accountable for their past actions and provide repre-
sentatives with an electoral mandate to take decisions 
on their behalf. Yet, the complex multi-level govern-
ance of the EU makes it less likely that European Par-
liament (EP) elections can function in the same way as 
national elections. Up until 2014 there was no connec-
tion between the outcome of EP elections and the 
composition of the prime executive agent at the EU-
level, the European Commission. Moreover, some of 
the most important EU decisions are ultimately taken 
by a majority vote of the heads of state in the Europe-
an Council, who are in turn accountable to the national 
parliaments.  
Thus, up until recently, EP elections did not enable 
voters to hold politicians directly accountable for EU 
policies. In addition, parties hardly ever discuss the 
contents of European policies during the campaigns, 
thus making it difficult for voters to give an electoral 
mandate for those policies. Previous research on Euro-
pean elections has demonstrated that voters, faced 
with elections that do not serve a clear purpose (e.g., 
Franklin, 2014), treat these as second-order national 
elections (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). According to this view, 
voters either use these elections to express loyalty to a 
national party, or they use them as a referendum on 
the performance of the national government. When 
dissatisfied with the current national government they 
are more likely to cast a protest vote than they would 
at national elections (e.g., Van der Eijk, Franklin, & 
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Marsh, 1996). Even though the second-order election 
thesis has been challenged (e.g., Hobolt & Spoon, 
2012; Hobolt, Spoon, & Tilley, 2009), it is still a domi-
nant perspective on European elections. However, 
there are three reasons why one could expect the 2014 
EP elections to be different.  
Firstly, the 2014 EP elections were the first in which 
frontrunner candidates of the five largest European po-
litical party families were put forth as the candidates 
for chairing the European Commission after the elec-
tions (the so called Spitzenkandidaten). This was done 
explicitly in order to show to the voters that executive 
power would also be at stake this time. The 
Spitzenkandidaten participated in several debates ca-
tering—at least in theory—to a pan-European audi-
ence. In this way, the prime executive figure in the 
Commission could claim to have an electoral mandate 
and this would ideally render the outcome of the elec-
tions more important. The EP campaign slogan ‘This 
time it’s different!’ made it clear that the EP sought to 
make voters aware of its new powers, which it claimed 
on the basis of the Lisbon Treaty.  
Secondly, the 2014 EP elections were held in the 
midst of a severe financial and economic crisis, which 
changed the nature of European collaboration as the 
EU had launched major rescue packages, introduced 
oversight mechanisms, and established a European 
semester system in the budget mechanism of member 
states. At the same time, EU citizens stridently protest-
ed against tight austerity measures across Europe, for 
which many people in the Southern countries held the 
EU (at least partially) responsible. Moreover, a growing 
number of EU citizens has been opposing further EU in-
tegration, such as the Euro rescue funds, a common 
immigration policy, or extensions to the freedom of 
movement. Even if this did not impinge directly upon 
the nature of European elections per se, one could ex-
pect these events to increase the interest of media and 
voters in European politics in general.  
Thirdly, the 2014 EP elections were held during a 
period when Eurosceptic parties at the left and right 
end of the political spectrum were doing very well in 
the polls. Many of these parties campaigned with Euro-
sceptic messages and the anticipated success of these 
parties was therefore considerable. At the very least, 
one might expect there to be increased politicization 
about the European project.  
Even though there are thus some reasons to expect 
the 2014 EP elections to be less second-order than 
previous ones, we do not know whether this was inde-
ed the case. If voters were unaware of the Spitzenkan-
didaten, this new arrangement will not have had much 
effect. Some voters may have been dissatisfied with 
the austerity measures the ‘troika’ imposed on 
Southern European member states, but even in the 
current setup of the EU there are few possibilities for 
them to use EP elections to hold anyone accountable 
for those policies. This issue brings together papers 
that focus on the question of whether and in which 
ways the 2014 EP elections were different from previ-
ous ones.1 This is important from the point of view of 
emerging scholarship on changes in the EU and from 
the point of view of the self-proclaimed ‘This time it’s 
different!’ slogan from the Parliament. The papers cen-
tre around three themes: 1) the role of the Spitzenkan-
didaten, 2) media and voters, and 3) voting behaviour. 
We will briefly discuss each of these. 
2. Theme 1: New Features of the Elections: The Role 
of the Spitzenkandidaten  
The first theme concerns the key new feature of the 
2014 EP elections, namely the role of the Spitzenkandi-
daten. The underlying question of those papers in this 
issue that focus on their role is whether and how the 
personalisation of the campaigns and the fact that exe-
cutive power was at stake (to some extent) changed 
the nature of the EP elections. Prominent theories on 
the EU’s democratic deficit would have expected this 
to be the case: Føllesdal and Hix (2006) as well as Hix 
(2008) have long suggested that open and rival candi-
dacies for Commission President would, among other 
things, enhance electoral contestation; and electoral 
contestation would in itself ‘allow a greater connection 
between voters’ preferences and coalitions and ali-
gnments in the EU institutions’ (Føllesdal & Hix, 2006, 
p. 553). Enhancing electoral contestation would thus 
contribute to overcoming the EU’s democratic deficit. 
Moreover, such a contest could also provide citizens 
with the necessary information to hold EU representa-
tives accountable in EP elections and therewith allevia-
te the EU’s accountability deficit (Hobolt & Tilley, 
2014). Elections in which candidates are up for re-
election provide the most obvious possibilities to hold 
politicians accountable for their actions in the past. 
Since none of the Spitzenkandidaten had been an EU 
Commissioner in the past, it is unlikely that the accoun-
tability deficit could have been resolved in the 2014 EP 
elections. Yet, the fact that the Spitzenkandidaten were 
candidates for an important executive position, can be 
                                                          
1 The plan for this issue originated at a workshop entitled ‘The 
European Elections of 2014’, which took place in Amsterdam 
on March 12 and 13, 2015. It was organised and funded by the 
Amsterdam Centre for Contemporary European Studies (AC-
CESS EUROPE), a centre jointly organised by the University of 
Amsterdam and the Free University Amsterdam. The issue 
brings together papers that were presented at this workshop, 
as well as papers that came in as a response to an open call. All 
papers were peer reviewed. We thank all authors, reviewers, 
the editors of Politics and Governance and the participants of 
the ACCESS EUROPE workshop for their collaboration and 
substantive input. The order of authors is alphabetical and re-
flects our equal contribution, both to this introduction as well 
as to the editorship of this special issue. 
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expected to strengthen the electoral connection of vo-
ters and the European Commission.  
This resonates with the motives of the European 
Parliament to foster the campaign context during the 
2014 elections. In its resolution of November 22, 2012 
it ‘urge[d] the European political parties to nominate 
candidates for the Presidency of the Commission’.2 
With this procedure, the EP had the intention to in-
crease its own legitimacy as a parliament ‘by connecting 
their respective elections more directly to the choice of 
the voters’. Moreover, the candidates were expected to 
‘play a leading role in the parliamentary electoral cam-
paign, in particular by personally presenting their pro-
gramme in all Member States of the Union’, which im-
plies that the EP expected the campaigns to raise the 
awareness and interest of European voters. 
Against this backdrop, studying the role of Spitzen-
kandidaten becomes particularly important because it 
was the first time in the history of EP elections that the 
major European party families nominated top candida-
tes for Commission President. For that reason, the con-
sequences of the Spitzenkandidaten nomination were 
not yet known during the campaigns. The Lisbon Treaty 
gave the European Council the right to put forward 
their preferred candidate by prescribing that, ‘[t]aking 
into account the elections to the European Parliament 
and after having held the appropriate consultations, 
the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, 
shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate 
for President of the Commission’ (Art. 17.7 TEU). 
Although the treaty only manifested the EP’s right to 
elect the Presidential candidate—which it had de facto 
exerted since 1994 by its own interpretations of the 
Maastricht Treaty (see Hix, 2002)—the Parliament in-
terpreted the new provisions as allowing it to nominate 
its own candidate, namely the Spitzenkandidat of the 
largest political party family. Remarkably, the heads of 
state in the European Council hardly commented on 
this procedure; and it was not clear during the campai-
gns whether they would even accept the Parliament’s 
initiative (see also Hobolt, 2014). It was only on June 
27, 2014, i.e., one month after the elections, that the 
Council ‘agreed to propose Jean-Claude Juncker to the 
European Parliament as candidate for President of the 
European Commission’3. This uncertain yet politicised 
electoral context provided an exciting opportunity for 
scholars to study the nomination process, public per-
ceptions of the Spitzenkandidaten as well as the electo-
ral consequences of their campaigns.  
The first contribution to this issue in this respect 
sheds light onto the candidate selection procedures 
                                                          
2 European Parliament resolution of November 22, 2012 on the 
elections to the European Parliament in 2014 (2012/2829 
(RSP)). 
3 Conclusions of the European Council, June 26/27, 2014 (EUCO 
79/14) 
within the five European party families that put 
forward Spitzenkandidaten for the election campaigns. 
By relying on party documents and semi-structured in-
terviews with relevant stakeholders, Put, Van Hecke, 
Cunningham and Wolfs (2016) argue that the novelty 
of the phenomenon also presented new opportunities 
and challenges for the European party families. The 
fact that the Spitzenkandidaten procedure was unpre-
cedented and its outcome uncertain would explain why 
the Europarties largely relied on existing and more gene-
ral intra-party decision-making procedures in the absen-
ce of specific rules. The various Europarties thus exhibi-
ted varying degrees of candidacy requirements, 
decentralisation, inclusion of the selectorate, and voting 
procedures. Yet Put et al. (2016) argue that the Europar-
ties made use of the new tool to strengthen their own 
position at the EU level and expect that selection pro-
cedures will be further professionalised in the future. 
While much of these internal selection procedures 
might have gone unnoticed by the public, the European 
media are crucial for informing European citizens about 
what is at stake in EU elections. This is why Schulze 
(2016) investigates the extent to which the Spitzenkan-
didaten were visible in major British, French, and Ger-
man newspapers during the campaigns. She conducts a 
quantitative content analysis of the 2014 EP election 
campaign coverage in several broadsheets and ta-
bloids. In order to comprehend how the Spitzenkandi-
daten were reported on across countries and newspa-
pers, Schulze (2016) positions her findings within a 
broader analysis of EU election news. She finds that the 
Spitzenkandidaten were most visible in the German 
press, followed by the French press, while British 
newspapers hardly paid attention to the Spitzenkandi-
daten. Generally, broadsheets reported on them more 
often than tabloids. However, she argues that the Spit-
zenkandidaten did not contribute substantially to a 
personalization of news coverage during the three 
weeks before the 2014 EP elections, although the ex-
tent to which this happened differs across countries.  
Ultimately, information is essential for the extent to 
which citizens can make sense of the Spitzenkandida-
ten: Gattermann, de Vreese, and van der Brug (2016) 
investigate the preference formation of Dutch citizens 
towards the three main contenders Juncker, Schulz, 
and Verhofstadt. They argue that regular news exposu-
re and especially general information about the EU as 
well as campaign-specific information about the Spit-
zenkandidaten represent important pre-conditions for 
citizens to formulate a preference towards the candi-
dates. Consequently, only few citizens actually provi-
ded their opinion; and only the most knowledgeable 
used cues of party identifications or ideological orien-
tations in their evaluations of the Spitzenkandidaten. 
The authors argue that this might be due to the novelty 
of the procedure and warn that it should not be dis-
missed right away. Instead, they propose to increase 
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the extent and salience of the campaign activities du-
ring the next EU elections in order to make EU citizens 
more aware and therewith to contribute to alleviating 
the EU democratic and accountability deficits. 
Finally, Maier, Rittberger and Faas (2016) assess 
one particular novelty of the Spitzenkandidaten pro-
cedure: the so-called Eurovision debate, the major pan-
European televised debate in which five of the six can-
didates who were nominated by the major party fami-
lies participated. The authors were interested in the ef-
fects of this debate on attitudes towards the EU and 
conducted a quasi-experiment with German students. 
Their results show that viewers of the debate generally 
became more favourable towards European integrati-
on and less frightened about the EU. Moreover, they 
find that respondents tended to provide positive feed-
back to the candidates’ statements and that these po-
sitive evaluations also led to a shift towards more pro-
European attitudes. Prior political knowledge, ho-
wever, played no major role in the perceptions and 
evaluations of the debates. But this does not imply that 
the debates are not important for attitude formation 
and ultimately political behaviour. On the contrary, the 
authors recommend making such debates between the 
Spitzenkandidaten more attractive for voters across 
Europe in future EU election campaigns.  
3. Theme 2: The Media and Voters  
Looking at the second theme, ‘the media and voters’, 
the contributions to this issue analyse mediated party 
mobilisation efforts and media effects on EU attitudes 
and electoral behaviour. Traditionally, the literature on 
the media and voters has taken as a starting point the 
idea of the EU being a ‘distant polity’ removed from 
most people’s daily lives. A sizeable body of literature, 
using both experiments, media content data, and (pa-
nel) survey data, has provided ample evidence for sig-
nificant effects of media on citizens’ attitudes towards 
the EU and their voting behaviour (see de Vreese & 
Boomgaarden, 2016, for a recent overview). In more 
recent years, a shift can be noted in the research 
towards specifying the conditions under which media 
and information has an effect on public attitudes and 
electoral behaviour.  
Using experimental evidence, exposure to framing 
EU enlargement news in positive and beneficial terms 
(versus negative and threatening terms) affects partici-
pants’ support for the EU’s future enlargement (De 
Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2003; De Vreese, Boomgaar-
den, & Semetko, 2011; Maier & Rittberger, 2008; 
Schuck & De Vreese, 2006). Using survey-based studi-
es, other research has demonstrated media effects on 
EU attitudes. For instance, De Vreese & Boomgaarden 
(2006) have shown how the tone of news media affects 
support for further EU enlargement by connecting me-
dia content and survey data in two different countries 
(see also Azrout, van Spanje, & De Vreese, 2012). Re-
cent studies stemming from the 2009 EP elections have 
also shown how exposure to news can affect both tur-
nout (Schuck, Vliegenthart, & de Vreese, 2016) and vo-
te choice (van Spanje & de Vreese, 2014). 
The first paper on the theme ‘media and voters’ in 
this issue deals with the impact of news coverage on 
changes in EU attitudes. De Vreese, Azrout, and Moeller 
(2016) test how public evaluations of the performance of 
the European Union changed in the run up to the electi-
ons in response to news coverage. They investigate the 
role played by the news media in shaping public opinion 
about EU performance by linking citizens’ evaluations 
across time collected in panel survey data to the news 
media content they were exposed to. They show that 
public opinion has changed towards the more negative, 
but also how exposure to media coverage can help im-
prove citizens’ evaluations of EU performance. 
Meijers and Rauh (2016) study patterns of partisan 
mobilisation on EU issues in the news in France and the 
Netherlands. Comparing the 2014 EP elections to the 
2009 elections, on aggregate they find no significant 
differences regarding party mobilisation on EU issues. 
Their main focus is, however, on the ways in which vi-
sible mobilisation efforts of challenger parties affect 
those of other parties in the news. Their analyses show 
that while mostly mainstream and especially incum-
bent parties publically mobilise on European issues du-
ring both campaigns, the mobilisation efforts from ‘ra-
dical’ parties became more visible during the 2014 
elections. Furthermore, the visibility of Eurosceptic 
parties exhibits significant contagion effects on mains-
tream parties’ visibility in the news. But the extent of 
these short-term effects was lower in the 2014 cam-
paign than it was in 2009.  
Turning to vote choice, Kleinnijenhuis and van Atte-
veldt (2016) show how the European elections in 2014 
were the first to be held after a long period in which 
EU-related news was dominant in the media. Their pa-
per asks how vote choice was influenced by campai-
gning on EU related issues. A news effects analysis ba-
sed on a content analysis of Dutch newspapers and 
television, and on a panel survey among Dutch voters 
revealed that EU issues functioned as wedge issues: 
the more strongly parties were associated in the news 
with the euro crisis and the Ukraine crisis, the less they 
succeeded in getting voter support. 
Collectively, the three papers show both change 
and continuity vis-à-vis extant research. The 2014 EP 
elections were different in the sense that they took 
place after a period of time in which the EU was much 
more visible on the media agenda than in any earlier 
election. However much of this coverage was devoted 
to the EU’s international role (e.g., in relation to the 
Crimea issue) or the economic developments in the EU 
and its member states. These are not necessarily topics 
that the EP elections address. The 2014 EP elections 
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were also different in the sense that they took place af-
ter a period of increasing politicization of EU politics. 
However, this increase did not per se improve the pu-
blic debate about the EU and Europe. In terms of the 
effects of exposure to news content, the scoreboard, as 
seen from the EP, is mixed. On the one hand, exposure 
to information about the EU resulted in less negative 
evaluations of the performance of the EU. This is argua-
ble good news for the EP as long as a sizeable share of 
EU citizens turns to mainstream news sources. However, 
it was also found that being associated with EU issues 
(albeit not all about the EP elections) was negatively as-
sociated with electoral success, that is to say, the EU is a 
topic on which parties can potentially lose votes.  
4. Theme 3: Electoral Behaviour  
The dominant paradigm in research on voting behavi-
our in EP elections is that these elections are second-
order national elections. In short, the theory holds that 
voters are largely unaware of European politics, that it 
is unclear what is at stake at these elections, that there 
are no clear issues on the basis of which people can 
choose between parties. In this situation, voters may 
either decide not to vote, or if they vote, to use their 
knowledge of national politics and national parties as 
an information shortcut. So, voters who turnout at 
these elections, use them mainly to express a prefe-
rence for national parties. According to Van der Eijk, 
Franklin, and Marsh (1996), compared to national elec-
tions, at which executive power is at stake, EP elections 
display fewer signs of strategic voting (‘voting with the 
head’) and more signs of sincere voting (‘voting with 
the heart’) and protest voting (‘voting with the boot’). 
As a consequence of these different motivations, EP 
elections display low turnout, a relatively poor perfor-
mance of mainstream and especially governing parties, 
and more support for smaller radical parties (e.g., Reif & 
Schmitt, 1980; Schmitt & Thomassen, 1999; Thomassen, 
2009; Van der Brug & De Vreese, 2016; Van der Brug & 
Van der Eijk, 2007; Van der Eijk & Franklin, 1996).  
Some studies in the last decade have questioned 
one of the main assumptions of the second-order 
perspective: that there are no clear issues at stake 
(e.g., Hobolt, Spoon, & Tilley, 2009), arguing that the 
process of European unification has itself become mo-
re politicised and that this issue could play a particular-
ly important role in European elections. However, whi-
le this could conceivably be the case, it is questionable 
whether this would make EP elections less second or-
der. Steps towards further European integration are 
decided at the national level, so that European unifica-
tion is in many ways also an issue in domestic politics. 
This argument has been made theoretically (e.g., Mair 
& Thomassen, 2010; Schmitt & Thomassen, 1999) and 
it has also been shown empirically that the issue of Eu-
ropean integration plays a role in national elections 
(e.g., De Vries, 2009, 2010).  
However, as we argued in the first section of this in-
troductory paper, there were some elements of the 
2014 EP elections, which had the potential to change its 
‘second-orderness’. As a result of the institution of Spit-
zenkandidaten, some executive power was now at stake, 
although it may not have been very clear to most voters. 
The austerity measures imposed on the Eurozone mem-
bers that were rescued from bankruptcy, made visible 
how much sovereignty has been handed over by natio-
nal states to the European level. Even if European electi-
ons offer little possibility to express policy preferences 
on these austerity measures—nor on other policies that 
are decided at the level of the EU—voters may become 
more aware of the importance of the EU and, hence, 
could be more motivated to participate in EU elections. 
The four contributions on these kinds of themes show, 
however, very little evidence that the EP elections of 
2014 are less second order than previous ones.  
To test the second order model, Kelbel, van Ingel-
gom and Verhaegen (2016) make use of the fact that 
the 2014 EP elections were held on the same day as 
regional elections in Belgium. As a consequence of the 
federalisation of Belgium, many important policies are 
decided at the level of the two regions Wallonia and 
Flanders, so that these regional elections can be consi-
dered to be (near) first order elections. The paper looks 
at motivations for split-ticket voting, to assess whether 
people employ different considerations when voting 
for representation at the different levels. Also, they 
compare 2014 and 2009, when EP elections also coin-
cided with regional elections. The article shows that 
split-ticket voting cannot be explained by economic vo-
ting, European identity, nor by attitudes towards inte-
gration in 2014. The introduction of Spitzenkandidaten 
did enhance split-ticket voting for Flemish voters who 
could directly vote for the Flemish candidate Verhofs-
tadt, while this did not increase split-ticket voting among 
voters who could only indirectly support the candidate 
(in Wallonia). This result thus suggests that the 2014 EP 
elections were still largely second order ones. 
Boomgaarden, Johann and Kritzinger (2016) make 
use of panel survey data in Austria to study the motives 
to change one’s party choice between a national and a 
European election. Looking first at aggregate level pat-
terns in the switches, these are by and large in line 
with the second order framework. Citizens were less 
inclined to turnout at the EP election than in national 
elections, they switched away from government par-
ties and smaller parties did relatively well. When loo-
king at individuals’ motivations for vote switching, they 
find that switches from government to opposition par-
ties are largely driven by discontent with the national 
government. In line with Hobolt et al. (2009) they find 
Euroscepticism to be an important predictor of 
switches to anti-EU parties.  
Okolikj and Quinlan (2016) employ the European 
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Elections Studies (EES) data from 2009 and 2014 to as-
sess economic voting in EP elections. Their study de-
monstrates that perceptions of the economy influen-
ced voters in both election years. In 2009 this was an 
across the board effect, while in 2014 the effects of 
economic perceptions were conditioned by how much 
responsibility voters felt the national government had 
for the state of the economy. The study also reveals 
cross-country differences. In particular, the effects 
were stronger in the bailout countries compared to 
non-bailout countries. As the effects of economic per-
ceptions are conditioned by perceptions of responsibi-
lity of the national government, these results clearly 
support the second order perspective on EP elections.  
Schmitt and Toygür (2016) employ data from the 
EES 2014, as well as aggregate level data on election 
outcomes to test the second order model. As an alter-
native they test two hypotheses on whether conse-
quences of the financial crisis explain the outcomes of 
the EP elections instead of the second order model. 
The authors analyse aggregate election results, both at 
the country level and at the party level and compare 
them with the results of the preceding first-order nati-
onal election in each EU member country. All of the 
tests of the model, the bivariate as well as the multiva-
riate ones are in line with the second order model.  
5. In Conclusion 
The 2014 EP elections were held under the slogan ‘this 
time it’s different’. The main idea was that, as a result 
of the introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten, executive 
power was at stake for the first time. Since there was 
more at stake, the elections would be ‘different’, mea-
ning more first order in the perceived ranking of voters 
and parties. In this issue we posed the question whet-
her this was true: ‘How different were the EP elections 
of 2014?’ Reviewing the eleven contributions in this is-
sue, we can conclude that 2014 was not as different 
from previous elections as one might have expected gi-
ven the different political and economic landscape and 
self-proclaimed relevance of the EP. Like in previous EP 
elections, turnout was low, and governing parties did 
not do well, while more radical Eurosceptic parties 
were rather successful. So, neither the introduction of 
Spitzenkandidaten, nor the increased politicisation 
around the EU, did much to change the second order 
nature of European elections.  
One plausible reason for why the introduction of 
Spitzenkandidaten had little effect could be that only 
few voters were aware of the new element. Moreover, 
the role of these Spitzenkandidaten remained largely 
unclear during the campaigns. Especially if Junker 
would be up for re-election in 2019, this would genera-
te a very different type of campaign dynamic and 
would conceivably generate greater media attention 
across Europe. This, in turn, could potentially make Eu-
rope’s citizens more aware of the candidates and their 
party political affiliations (Gattermann et al., 2016) and 
affect voter attitudes towards the EU or specific policy 
positions (see Maier et al., 2016), which might become 
decisive for their electoral behaviour.  
In addition to the Spitzenkandidaten, the political 
context of the 2019 EP elections will also matter. In the 
coming years, the EU is facing a number of big challen-
ges, such as the refugee and ongoing sovereign debt 
crises, but also the possibility of a Brexit. These chal-
lenges will make EU affairs more salient in the public 
eye. Yet, the increased salience of ‘Europe’ will not by 
itself make EP elections less second order. That will 
depend on whether there is something at stake, such 
as the re-election of the Commission President, and 
whether voters are aware of what is at stake. 
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